Determination and Dominance in Williams

Raymond Williams begins his essay, “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory” by stating that, “Any modern approach to a Marxist theory of culture must begin by considering the proposition of a determining base and a determined superstructure” (130). Williams, however, states that he would prefer to start from the proposition that “social being determines consciousness” (130). Directly Williams steps away from the structural arguments of his peers, rejects accusations against Marx over fixed and definite

Williams looks at the “language of determination” linking the base and superstructure in Marx’s writing; in describing this, Marx often uses the German word “bestimmen”, which becomes “determines” in English (130). Williams points out that the language of determination during Marx’s time was steeped in history of idealist and theological accounts of the world, but that Marx was opposed to an “ideology that had been insistent on the power of certain forces outside man, or, in its secular version, on an abstract determining consciousness”, but instead puts the “origin of determination in men’s own activities” (130). Therefore Williams constructs that there are at least two senses of determination, one that rests on an external cause and predicts or prefigures activity, and another notion of determination as “setting limits, exerting pressures” (131). Williams argues that determination must be revalued toward the latter, and in doing so we must also revalue “the base” away from an abstraction of a fixed economy and towards “the specific activities of men in real social and economic relationships” and within those activities, contradictions and variations exist where in the base within a state of active process (132). The contradictions between relationships of production and the consequent social relationships forms the foundation of Marx’s historical materialism and is the source for Williams’ argument for a dynamic, active base and the possibility for change in both the base and superstructure. A further idea Williams takes on, which becomes important for his argument, is the notion of productive forces, not those limited within capitalist economy, but rather productive forces as a production of society itself. This, according to Williams, follows Marx’s claim that “most important thing that a worker ever produces is himself, himself in the fact of that kind of labour, or the broader historical emphasis of men producing themselves and their history” (133). This broader formulation of productive forces expands understanding of the base and weakens the inclination to label some social forces as simply “superstructural”, and therefore fixed. (133)

Williams moves onto a discussion of Hungarian philosopher and literary theorist Georg Lukács and the concept of social “totality”. As with the layered notion of base and superstructure, social totality fits Williams’ claim that “social being determines consciousness” (133). Totality recognizes that “society is composed of a large number of social practices which form a concrete social whole” and additionally that these practices interact, relate and combine with one another in complicated ways (134). Williams argues that the notion of totality misses any process of determination, and that by acknowledging these practices without recognizing a specific organization or structure “directly related” to social practices, is to falter: Williams goes so far to say that in doing so “we fail to recognize reality at all” (134). Without a superstructural element, we are unable to recognize social intentions present in every society, intentions which “in all our experience have been the rule of a particular class” [emphasis added] (134). Williams argues for the necessity of a superstructural element as a means of denying the natural and “universal legitimacy” of bourgeois laws and ideologies and maintaining the agency to question social intentions.

Commodities, Labour and Monetary Exchange in Marx’s Capital (alternate title: a tale of exploitation)

In his magnum opus, Capital, Marx begins by analyzing commodities, the unit of exchange within a capitalist mode of production. A commodity, Marx writes, is an object outside of ourselves that satisfies human needs or desire (45). A commodity consists of two parts, its use-value, its utility which comes to fruition through consumption, and its exchange-value, which places commodities in relation to one another in order to reflect some form of equality within exchange (46-47). This sense of equality is what Marx comes to label “value”, and is calculable because both commodities are products of human labour (48). This abstract human labour is embodied within the commodity it produces and separates the producer from his product. This separation is key for Marx’s development of the Money form later on in the chapter.

The abstraction from specific forms of labour to that of labour in general acts as predecessor for the product of labour to be transformed into a commodity. A product of labour becomes a commodity when it is transferred to another, for their use, by means of exchange (51). The abstraction from product to commodity is parallel to the abstraction from concrete to abstract labour; in order for products of labour to be exchanged, specific labour becomes abstract and therefore, exchangeable. This abstract human labour is measured through labour time (the socially necessary amount of time involved for production on average); commodities, therefore, that contain equal quantities of labour therefore have the same value (49).

It is only through the process of exchange that value is expressed (value has no existence outside of exchange). Just as commodities and labour, exchange is presented as a duality, with both the relative and equivalent form. Through a series of relational equations (58-81) Marx unfolds the relations of commodities and, ultimately to the expression of value, that is the money commodity (80). This “universal equivalent” is the turning point from the straight forward and clear expressions of Robinson Crusoe’s labour into the muddy and mystifying events of a bourgeois economy.

A commodity, therefore, does not assume a mysterious nature because of its use-value (use-values are produced in all forms of society (53) but by the social relations under which the commodity is produced, in so far as that “the moment that men in any way work for one another, their labour assumes a social form” (82). Within a capitalist society, producers are alienated from the product of their labour (in exchange for money commodity, i.e. wages) and the social relation no longer exists between persons, but between things (84). The products of labour are transformed into commodities and men’s labour is presented as “an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour” (83).

Through this process commodities appear to gain an independent existence where in relations of production are no longer ruled by persons, but rather, persons are ruled by the process of exchange. This is what Marx refers to “commodity fetishism” (83) and what masks the true relationship of production (between worker and capitalist). Producers, alienated from the products of their labour, receive the illusion of autonomy within the bounds of exchange, while capitalist relations of production subsist on the hegemonic exploitation of these workers. It is in the money form where the “mystery” of commodities unfolds itself and repressive actions of bourgeois economy are concealed (87).

The system of monetary exchange is asserted as an inherent formation of society, the relations of production as an outpouring of nature rather than social conditions. Money cloaks the correctly social character of private labour and social relations between producers (86). Private and collective labour are severed by exchange while correspondingly, bourgeois economy flourishes in this detachment. Marx addresses in a footnote (92) the flaw of “vulgar economy” which deals only with the appearances of bourgeois society without investigating the real relations of production (a topic addressed by classical political economy). Through examining the material basis of society, Marx finds that bourgeois economy is constituted by this material basis. He writes:

“each special mode of production and the social relations corresponding to it, in short, that the economic structure of society, is the real basis on which the juridical and political superstructure is raised, and to which definite social forms of thought correspond; that the mode of production determines the character of the social, political, and intellectual life generally” (footnote, 92-93)

It is in this passage where change in the relations of production presents itself as a realistic and imperative aim of revolutionaries. Rather than enduring a belief in the inevitable structure of production brought down by a “system of nature”, Marx tears down the presuppositions of bourgeois economists and reveals the social roots of capitalist relations of production. By creating this dichotomy between nature and history, producers are presented a reality where their labour is not just something to be bought and sold as if it were any other commodity on the market. In the “socialization” of production relations, the value of human labour is not calculated through means of exchange, but through the cooperative, where “labour of the individual is posited from the outset as social labour” (Grundrisse, 172). Alienation and commodity fetishism are replaced with community ownership over the means of production and social relations between people, rather than things. By reorganizing the means of production and relations of production, the mode of production in a society is altered, and subsequently the opportunity for the economic structure of society (i.e. capitalism) to be replaced with by a new system, where in, the common interest is upheld and the exploitation of the worker is abolished.

Distribution, Exchange and Social Labour in Marx’s Grundrisse

(draft) I would like to continue to come back to these thoughts with enlightenment from class discussion, and as I can further my understanding of Marx’s logic behind production and its relation to exchange

Marx asks the question, “does distribution stand at the side of and outside production as an autonomous sphere”? (94). In relating the acts of consumption, exchange, and distribution to production, Marx is careful to determine the causality between these four economic events. He determines that the “structure [Gliederung] of distribution is completely determined by the structure of production” (95). It is worth noting the emphasis he places when stating that it is “completely determined by” the larger structure, that is production. Classic economists (see Mill) have attempted to present production as distinct from distribution, and therefore independent from one another (87). Within this schism disparities of wealth and capital develop and bourgeois relations find justification within so-called “eternal natural laws” (87).

The division between production and distribution is attainable, Marx writes, when the individual is alienated from his labour. Within the freedom of economic society, man is no longer bound to a specific form of labour (e.g. agriculture), but can seek out a number of industries and trades. In these branches he finds work under an existing system (ex. a factory), but ceases to find meaning within the work itself, but rather, from the product of work. His product is not the commodity that he produces (for that is quickly estranged from him once completed), but rather the determined exchange value he produces (157). In exchange value, “the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things” (157); all activity is commodified and social power takes form in things. Faith is no longer placed in individuals, but in the objectified relation (money) between them (160).

Within undeveloped systems of exchange (ex. feudalism), social relations were overtly determined through systemic definitions of power (lord/vassal, landlord/serf, etc.), reinforced through family lineage (163). Within money relations (ex. capitalism), personal and blood ties emerge only as personal relations (and no longer as systematic reproduction), and the individual has the appearance of independence within an objective and free system (163). However, the objective dependence present in the latter case is principally an amendment of the personal dependency in the former case, where ruling over the individual comes not from a character, but rather, from an abstraction (164). This perceived freedom exists only within the consciousness of the individuals, who continue to exist within and under bourgeoisie society.

The worker’s labour results in a product that becomes a commodity and in turn, becomes exchange value (165). This exchange enables the autonomy of the worker to use his exchange value (labour) to engage in the market to seek out additional commodities, which have also been bought with the labor of others. The entire system operates under the swift hand of those who control means of production (capitalists) and consents certain “freedoms” to laborers, in order to continue the tidy profit they receive from the surplus of their wage laborers. Since production and distribution have been isolated from one another, the worker does not explicitly see the disparity between his labor and his exchange value (which, again, is determined by the relations of production). Just as the serf and slave work to survive, the wage laborer works under the jurisdiction of the capitalist (87), but is handed minute amounts of autonomy in order that he not conceive of any injustice.